Dispute resolution clauses are a common and potentially important component of many types of standard form contracts. I examine the use of dispute resolution clauses in 597 end-user license agreements (EULAs) of software packages sold online. I find that 75% of EULAs include choice of law clauses, 28% include forum selection clauses, 6% include arbitration clauses, and none include class action waivers. Sellers are equally likely to include dispute resolution clauses in the EULAs of consumer-oriented and business-oriented products. Despite the concerns of some legal academics, I do not find much evidence of "strategic" use of DRCs to advantage sellers over buyers. For example, sellers located in states with "seller-friendly" laws are no more likely to include choice of law or choice of forum clauses than sellers in states with stronger consumer protections; despite UCITA's flexible choice-of-law rules and otherwise seller-friendly provisions, sellers do not go out of their way to select UCITA; and, there is no evidence that fora selected are intentionally inconvenient to buyers. These results question certain proposals to regulate dispute resolution clauses in consumer form contracts on the basis of strategic behavior by sellers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Standard form contracts governing consumer transactions often include clauses that specify how disputes will be resolved. Such dispute resolution clauses (DRCs) spell out which law should govern and in which forum a dispute should be heard. The choices made are important because they help determine whether a party will find it worthwhile to seek legal redress upon being injured. And the possibility that such clauses specify laws and fora which are not mutually convenient for the buyer and the seller has multiplied with the growth in online commerce, as such commerce involves transactions between buyers and sellers that are often distant.
The use of DRCs in mass market transactions, both online and traditional, has sparked controversy among academics and legislators. One position that some have taken is that liberal enforcement of DRCs is desirable. DRCs help sellers minimize costs associated with legal complexities of transacting in many states at once. Sellers protect themselves from the risk of being sued in whichever jurisdiction buyers reside, safeguard from having to comply with the laws of inconsistent jurisdictions (a pervasive problem in online transactions), and economize on legal representation by having to be familiar with the law of only one state. This arrangement also benefits consumers, as they would receive the cost savings in the form of lower prices. That is, although the DRCs often limit consumers' options of legal redress ex post (by, say, restricting class actions) consumers receive the value of the foregone option ex ante in the form of lower prices.
1 Moreover, granting the parties flexibility in contractual choice of law and fora would encourage competition among states to provide more efficient contract laws. 2 An opposing position is that sellers' use of DRCs puts the general public and small business users at a disadvantage. Forum selection clauses do not represent a joint effort between buyers and sellers to maximize surplus by reducing commercial uncertainty, but rather the sellers' own prescription of the most advantageous forum. Sellers exploit their superior bargaining power by requiring disputes to be heard in a forum convenient to them, where they have business ties or political influence to benefit from local favoritism. 3 They choose sellerfriendly laws and procedural rules, or mandatory arbitration that impairs buyers' ability to seek court relief and might preclude class actions. 4 This inability to seek legal redress is particularly problematic in consumer markets, where buyers are unlikely to shop around carefully and thus only ex post mechanisms like litigation would be able to correct market imperfections.
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Under this skeptical view, choice of law clauses also remove ex post corrective mechanisms by enabling sellers to avoid state consumer protection laws, which are designed, in part, precisely to address market failures stemming from consumers' inability to read or understand the fine print. As one commentator notes (based on anecdotal evidence) that "we now see the aggressive use of choice of law clauses in consumer and small business settings to a degree unimagined in the late 20 th Century and this development threatens to undermine the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued." See also Clayton P. Rev. 697 (2001) ; William J. Woodward, Jr., "Sale" of Law and Forum and the Widening Gulf Between "Consumer" and "Nonconsumer" Contracts in the UCC, 75 Wash. U. L. Q. 243 (1997) . 4 America Online v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. App. Ct. Feb. 7, 2001) . It has been argued that sellers' aggressive use of mandatory and choice of forum clauses has led to a significant reduction in judicial opinions, a consequent slowing down in the development of common law, and a disruption in consumers' ability to obtain compensation for damages. See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lynn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 30 (2004) . 5 There is also no evidence in my sample that the modest fraction of sellers that uses choice of forum clauses goes out of its way to select a forum that may be inconvenient for buyers.
Choice of forum clauses always stipulate the same state as choice of law clauses, which in turn is typically the headquarters state. Of course, sellers could be selecting a local forum to obtain beneficial treatment from courts, but since the median firm with a choice of forum clause has only 35 employees, firms here are not large enough to have real political clout. The more likely explanation is that firms simply select the most convenient forum, which is the local forum.
Finally, among the small fraction of EULAs that contain arbitration clauses, about 30% (and 50% of those that pertain to consumer-oriented products) stipulate California law and venue. This is inconsistent with the suggestion that sellers are trying to select pro-seller laws to govern their substantive claims, as California affords many protections to consumers in arbitration. Also, the vast majority of arbitration clauses select the American Arbitration Association to govern the dispute, a widely recognized neutral organization with supplemental procedures for disputes involving consumers. The distribution across arbitration organizations is similar for business-oriented products The remainder of this chapter describes the data and the statistical tests with more detail.
II. THE SAMPLE
I use a large subsample of the EULAs which I put together in a previous study.
14 That study looked at 647 EULAs from 598 distinct companies. Typically, the EULA of one representative product is studied for each company, but for 49 companies, I gather EULAs for both the "business" and "consumer" versions of the same product. All software products for which EULAs were gathered in that sample are sold online through a corporate website to U.S.
buyers.
In this paper, I narrow the sample down to companies for which I was able to document that the company was incorporated in the U.S. or else had a major U.S. subsidiary. This led to a sample of 597 EULAs from 552 companies. For each EULA, I record whether it includes a choice of law clause and, if so, the state whose law is chosen. I follow the same process for choice of forum clauses. Finally, I record whether the EULA contains an arbitration clause, the arbitration forum, and the name of the organization that will arbitrate the dispute. 15 As a company's choice of a particular law or venue may be closely related to its location or state of incorporation, especially if the choice is not "strategic," I note the state of incorporation as well as the state of headquarters. 16 To determine whether sellers impose more stringent DRCs on unsophisticated buyers, I note whether the product seems directed to the general public or to business users. As the sample in this paper overlaps heavily with that used in previous papers, I refer the reader to those papers for further details on the data collection procedure.
15 Although the inclusion of class action waivers in credit card form contracts has attracted a lot of attention from legal academics, I find no evidence of their use in software license contracts. For this reason, I don't record whether the EULA has a class action waiver. The same is true for clauses requiring that the parties meet with a mediator before going to court. I found only one EULA that required mediation. 16 Some companies have offices in several states, but for practical purposes I only record the location of their headquarters.
I also collect several other market, product, and company characteristics for use as control variables. The summary statistics are similar to those reported in my previous studies, so I only mention them briefly. Average revenue is $537 million but median revenue is only $2.4 million, indicating that the average is driven by very large companies such as Microsoft and Adobe. Ninety-two percent of the companies in the sample are corporations, 5% are limited liability companies, and the remaining companies are sole proprietorships or partnerships.
Publicly-traded companies make up 16% of the sample. A little under half of the products in the sample, 43%, are oriented towards consumers (or small home businesses) rather than businesses.
The average price of consumer-oriented products is $137 and the median price is $65, while the average price of business-oriented products is $1,297 and the median price is $499.
III. THE PRESENCE OF DRCs IN SOFTWARE EULAS

A. How Pervasive are Choice of Law, Forum, and Arbitration Clauses?
Some of the most novel findings of the paper are simple descriptive statistics. The right column in Table 1 shows that a majority, or 75% of the EULAs in the sample, include choice of law clauses. In contrast, only 28% of EULAs includes forum selection clauses. And only 6% of the EULAs include arbitration clauses. Are these results surprising? We expect internet sellers to include choice of law clauses to minimize the costs of having to comply with the laws and regulations of multiple jurisdictions. Given that such clauses are generally enforceable, it is harder to understand why 25% of sellers in the sample choose to remain exposed to the risk of having to comply with inconsistent laws. This is especially puzzling, considering that sellers (not matter how small) can easily copy the dispute resolution provisions from more sophisticated EULAs, thus reducing the drafting costs of these clauses to a very low level. Even if the chances of being sued are small, one significant lawsuit could wipe out a small seller. A possible explanation is that choice of law clauses can hurt vendors because they increase the probability that class actions will be certified. That is, a choice of law clause will eliminate the argument that the case lacks commonality because the laws of many states will have to be applied to adjudicate the rights of class members.
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The results above may be influenced by the presence of many small companies in the sample with relatively simpler licenses. Since larger companies tend to sell more software, the left column in Table 1 shows the revenue weighted average for of presence of DRCs to provide a sense of the type of EULA that a given buyer is actually likely to encounter in the market. Under this measure, the proportion of EULAs with choice of law clauses increases to 91%, the proportion with forum selection clauses rise moderately to 42%, and the proportion with arbitration clauses shrinks dramatically to 1%. The presence of choice of law clauses now seems more consistent with expectations.
Even under this revised measure, the question remains why forum selection and arbitration clauses are so rare, given that otherwise sellers who mass-market their products over the Internet are exposed to the risk of getting sued virtually anywhere a plaintiff resides. It is also surprising that sellers include choice of law clauses but fail to include choice of forum clauses.
These results are not inconsistent with those of Eisenberg and Miller who, in a recent study of choice of law and forum selection clauses in 412 intensely negotiated merger and acquisition contracts by sophisticated commercial parties, find that only 53% contain forum selection clauses.
19 Sparse use of these clauses is common among large and small parties alike. The sparse use of arbitration seems particularly surprising if this form of adjudication is indeed faster, cheaper, and more predictable than traditional adjudication. Alternatively, this might reflect the nature of software disputes, in which it is common for one party to seek injunctive relief. Parties seeking equitable remedies, as is common in disputes involving issues of intellectual property or confidentiality, might prefer that a court rather than an arbitrator be the one to grant such remedies.
Not a single EULA out of 597 includes a class action waiver. Again, sellers might not use class action waivers because of concerns about their enforceability, or because of the bad publicity such waivers might generate. While much analysis remains to be done, these results immediately cast doubt on casual claims that sellers' rampant use of choice of forum and arbitration clauses deprive buyers of their day in court, or that sellers are shielding themselves from liability by making it impossible for buyers to aggregate low-value claims.
B. Relationships Among DRCs and Market, Product, Buyer, and Seller Characteristics
This section explores the results above in further detail. For example, the sample includes 185 EULAs from products in the "Business and Office" sector. Of these, 137 (74%) include choice of law clauses, 52 (28%) include forum selection clauses, and 7 (4%) include arbitration clauses. 63 of the EULAs in this category are for consumer-oriented products, of which 46 (73%) include choice of law clauses, 19 (30%) include forum selection clauses, and 3 (5%) include arbitration clauses. The remaining 122
EULAs are for business-oriented products, 91 (75%) of which include choice of law clauses, 33 (27%) include choice of forum clauses, and 4 (3%) include arbitration clauses.
The propensity to use different types of DRCs is similar across sectors-in each sector, EULAs are more likely to include choice of law than choice of forum or arbitration clauses.
Slight differences arise, however, as evidenced by the F-tests, which reject the equality of incidence of choice of law and arbitration clauses across sectors. Products in the "Home and Hobbies" and "Education" sectors tend to have less DRCs than sectors such as "Business and
Office." Surprisingly, in product categories that are generally directed to buyers are that are less likely to be repeat players or careful shoppers, the incidence of DRCs is not higher. Another point worth noting is the heterogeneity within sectors. If other product characteristics are held constant, this heterogeneity suggests that it would be possible for concerned buyers to comparison shop for their preferred DRCs.
Again in contrast to the consumer abuse hypothesis, Table 2 shows that the incidence of DRCs is similar for consumer-and business-oriented products. EULAs of business-oriented products are more likely to include choice of law clauses, and less likely to include forum selection clauses, but the differences are very small and not statistically significant (unreported).
Since 45 companies in my sample sell both business and consumer versions of the same product, I can also test whether sellers offer more restrictive contracts to unsophisticated consumer than to savvy business buyers and also control for company and product characteristics. I find that sellers use virtually the same clauses for both business and consumer versions (unreported).
Thus, even sellers who could in principle easily discriminate among buyer types do not, in fact, offer more onerous DRCs to less sophisticated consumers. These results are consistent with what I found in previous studies, that EULAs of consumer products did not have more restrictive terms (in dimensions other than dispute resolution) than those of business products, and that sellers of consumer software were equally likely to use "pay now, terms later" contracts with both types of buyers.
21 Table 3 develops this analysis by studying the company, product, and market characteristics that are associated with a particular dispute resolution clause. In models (1) through (4), the dependent variable is Choice of Law Specified, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 the EULA includes a choice of law clause and 0 otherwise. 22 Product price is the only product characteristic that increases the chance that the EULA will include a choice of law clause, with a 100% increase in price increasing the probability of a choice of law clause by 4% to 5%. This is result is robust to the inclusion to state, market, and sector fixed effects. While I am agnostic about causality, lacking an instrument for product price, this positive association is not, at face value, consistent with the theoretical prediction that sellers must offer lower prices in order to accept terms favorable to sellers. Instead, perhaps an explanation is that buyers of more expensive products are more likely to sue in the event of a dispute, and thus sellers of more 21 Supra note 14. 22 As an alternative to simple "linear probability" models, I have also estimated logit models, with virtually identical results in terms of statistical significance and implied economic significance. I report the linear probability models because they are simpler to interpret. expensive products (who face more lawsuits) are more likely to reduce their higher expected legal costs by subjecting their transactions to a unique law. Another possible explanation for this result might have to do with the fact that an overwhelming number (40%) of choice of law clauses select the laws of California or Massachusetts, two states known for their pro-consumer laws.
23 Choice of law clauses are priced, perhaps, to reflect the benefit they accord consumers.
More realistically, though, choice of law clauses are not first-order determinants of product price, and it is hard to imagine that most buyers factor EULAs' inclusion of a choice of law clause in their purchase decision.
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As to company characteristics that are associated with a choice of law clause, the results
show that larger companies and, controlling for size, younger companies are more likely to include these clauses. The size relationship may have to do with the fact that larger companies are more likely to obtain legal advice from counsel who may take more precautions to limit exposure legal exposure and in particular may wish to select the law with which they are most familiar. companies in the sample, on the other hand, selling software online represents an expansion of product lines, and their legal departments may not have kept up.
In models (5) through (8), I examine the factors that affect the likelihood that a EULA will include a forum selection clause. The dependent variable is Choice of Forum Specified, a dummy variable indicating the existence of a forum selection clause. In models (9) through (12) the dependent variable is Arbitration Clause Specified, another dummy variable. The results are generally similar to those for choice of law clauses. Larger companies are significantly more likely to include these DRCs, as are younger companies. On the other hand, product price plays no role for either of these clauses, in contrast to the results for choice of law clauses.
Interestingly, public companies are, all else equal, more likely to include choice of forum clauses. "Developer" licenses are somewhat more likely to include arbitration clauses.
These results-that buyer type is not related to the frequency of DRCs-contrast with anecdotal claims that sellers are more likely to impose restrictive DRCs (such as mandatory arbitration) to the general public or less sophisticated buyers. Still, despite this evidence, one might still be concerned that consumers are being discriminated against in another way, that they are not getting price reductions in exchange for accepting restrictions, while business are.
However, as discussed above, note that DRCs are not compensated for with lower prices on average across buyer types; indeed, the only significant relationship between price and the presence of DRCs (involving choice of law provisions) is positive, not negative. Nonetheless, I
have tested for the possibility that the tradeoff between DRCs and price is more favorable for business buyers, i.e. more negative for them and more positive for consumer buyers. I create an interaction variable of the log of price and the consumer buyer dummy, include it alongside the previous variables, and examine its coefficient. Unreported results show no significant coefficients of either sign. Thus there is no empirical evidence of a different tradeoff between DRCs and price for business and consumer buyers.
IV. LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE OF STRATEGIC USE OF DRCs
A. Are Choices of Law More Likely in Seller-Friendly States?
The last column of each panel of Table 3 shows that the location of the headquarters of the company is not a primary determinant of the presence of a DRC, as the state fixed effects are at best marginally significant. Nonetheless, it may be the case that sellers are discernibly more likely to select DRCs in seller-friendly states such as Delaware, Maryland, New York, and Virginia, and less likely to select them in more consumer-friendly states such as California, Illinois (at the state level), Iowa, Massachusetts, and North Carolina.
26 (Assume for the moment that when sellers select a particular law, they select the law of their headquarters state. We will relax this below.)
To investigate this possibility in detail, 
B. Do Sellers Actively Establish Relationships in Seller-Friendly States?
A key assumption in the above analysis is that when a corporation selects a choice of law, it selects the law of its own state. Of course, the easiest way for sellers to establish the UCC's Section 1-105 "reasonable relationship" requirement under the current approach is to establish their business in the state whose laws they wish their transactions be governed by. Alternatively, sellers can satisfy this requirement just by incorporating in a given state. 27 Table 5 One way for sellers to behave strategically is to locate in states with seller friendly laws, such as Delaware, Maryland, New York, and Virginia, as described above. This behavior has been observed, for example, in credit card companies that generally choose to locate in Delaware 27 When incorporation alone is the sole relationship to the selected law, there has been disagreement among courts on whether that state is "reasonably related" to the transaction. Thus, enforcement will depend on the forum that hears the dispute. For cases where incorporation alone suffices to establish a relationship, see, e.g., CIENA Corp. v. Jarrard, 203 F.3d 312, 324 (4th Cir. 2000) and Valley Juice Ltd. v. Evian Waters of France, Inc., 87 F.3d 604, 608 (2d Cir. 1996) . See also Restatement (Second) Perhaps it is the deviations from the diagonal that contain some support for strategic use of choice of law. However, there is no obvious deviation toward the "seller-friendly" states and away from the "buyer-friendly" ones examined in the previous subsection. In particular, given that UCITA is particularly seller-friendly for software publishers, it is interesting to focus just on Maryland and Virginia. However, of the 62 EULAs that do not select the laws of the sellers' home state, only one selects Virginia, and none selects Maryland. A useful perspective on these results involves a comparison between firm location and state of incorporation. As has been widely documented (and as I have confirmed in this sample), sellers that do not incorporate in their home state are most likely to incorporate in Delaware. That is, for corporate law purposes, many firms appear to make careful decisions and perhaps incur costs to choose the state of incorporation. In contrast, there is no evidence here to suggest that they go similarly out of their way to establish out-of-state relationships for consumer law purposes.
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28 Eisenberg & Miller, supra, note 13, also find that companies are more likely to select Delaware for incorporation than they are likely to select Delaware law in their choices of law and forum. The remaining off-
C. Choice of Forum
Finding little evidence of strategic use of choice of law clauses, we turn to choice of forum clauses. Recall that forum selection is much rarer than choice of law, with only 28% of EULAs containing such a clause, and hence the potential for systematic abuse is lower. In this subset, perhaps choice of forum could be used strategically in that sellers go out of their way to select a forum that is inconvenient for buyers. There is no evidence of this in my sample, however, as choice of forum clauses (when they are used) are always exactly equal to choice of law, which in turn is almost always the headquarters state. Still, choice of forum could be considered strategic to the extent that it requires out of state buyers to litigate in particular forum, which may be distant from the buyer.
One other way in which choice of forum could be used strategically is suggested by Bebchuk and Cohen. They point out that one reason for sellers to incorporate in-state is to obtain beneficial treatment by courts.
29 Unfortunately, the analogous hypothesis for choice of forum clauses is difficult to distinguish from the simpler hypothesis that sellers simply choose the forum that is most convenient. The fact that the median of the 156 firms in my sample with a choice of forum clause has only 35 employees, however, suggests that the majority of firms here are simply not large enough to have meaningful political clout.
D. Arbitration
Finally, sellers can take advantage of buyers by choosing to arbitrate claims. The main concern about arbitration is its very use, which deprives consumers of the possibility of a jury diagonal 14% includes a number of U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-owned firms whose EULA specifies the law of the firms' home country and firms that have been acquired in the recent past but whose EULAs still stipulate the law of the state of the original firm. trial. Regardless whether arbitration is viewed as abusive or as a less costly alternative to litigation, arbitration is very rare in my sample, so it will receive only brief attention below.
For the small sample of sellers that use arbitration, one concern is that sellers will select pro-seller laws to govern the substantive claim. This is not the case in my sample, however, as sellers who select arbitration invariably select the law of the state in which they are headquartered. The same is true for arbitration location. In fact, about 50% of arbitration clauses in the EULAs of consumer-oriented products select California law and California venue. As is well known, California affords many protections to consumers in arbitration.
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Finally, sellers could be somewhat strategic in their choice of procedural arbitration rules, for instance, by selecting an organization that charges high fees to consumers or that have sellerfriendly procedural rules. I find that 74% (25 out of 34) of the arbitration clauses in consumeroriented EULAs select the American Arbitration Association, a widely recognized neutral organization with supplementary procedures for consumer disputes involving a standard form contract drafted by a larger business. 31 A little over 10% of consumer contracts do not stipulate an arbitration organization, and the remaining fraction selects the National Arbitration Forum or JAMS to govern the arbitration. Of these two, consumer advocates have expressed concern only about NAF's high fees. The sample is too small to test whether the distribution across organizations is similar for business-oriented products.
V. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
30 For example, the California Arbitration Act mandates a waiver of arbitration fees for low income consumers and requires arbitration organizations to publish its consumer arbitration decisions See California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1284.3, 1281.96. 31 The consumer section of the AAA webpage reads: "The AAA will only administer your dispute if the arbitration clause meets certain fairness standards that are contained in the AAA's Consumer Due Process Protocol… [U]under the AAA's procedures, you may claim any amount of special damages such as attorney's fees or punitive damages, without an increase in fees." At http://www.adr.org/Consumer. Sellers often reduce the uncertainty about which laws and regulations will apply to their transaction by including choice of law, forum, or arbitration clauses in standard form contracts.
This practice has sparked heated debate among legal academics and legislators. A serious concern is that sellers take advantage of consumers' lack of bargaining power or attention to fine print by including choice of law clauses that deprive consumers of state consumer protection laws, forum selection clauses that make it too costly for consumers to pursue their claims in court, and individualized arbitration clauses that prevent class actions.
Relying on one of the first large-sample analysis of the actual use of DRCs, this analysis finds little evidence to substantiate this concern. DRCs are not used to a greater extent against consumers; they are not used strategically to inconvenience buyers or to import pro-seller contract law regimes; and they most often refer to the state where the seller is headquartered. 
